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The paper outlines the foundations of the "Nordic balance" as a low tension zone in the bi-
polar Europe during the Cold War. The co-operation in regional "security community ", as
perceived by Karl Deutsch shares certain common feelings and practices closely related to the
orientation of peaceful change. Such "community" was created as both effective and natural,
and this process was not imposed through a formal framework of supranational institutions.
However, after the events of 1989-91 the Nordic balance disappeared while the security com-
munity was preserved. These events transformed the North European security situation creat-
ing two pillars of "parallel action ", one consisting of Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and the
other of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
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1. Introduction
During the Cold War, the Nordic countries
formed a low-tension zone in bipolar Europe. Swe-
den was a neutral in the middle of the zone, Finland
was a Soviet-dependent neutral to the East, and Den-
mark and Norway were low-profile members of
NATO to the West. The low profile meant, i.a., that
they did not host foreign bases or nuclear weapons
on their mainland territories. The philosophy behind
the so-called 'Nordic balance' was that Soviet power
abstention vis a vis Finland was a prerequisite for
the Danish and Norwegian low profiles in NATO -
and vice versa.
Moreover, since the beginning of the century
the Nordic countries have jointly constituted a so-
called 'security community'. This concept, as framed
by the American political scientist Karl W.
Deutsch, means a group of people who have attained
a sense of community, a 'we feeling', and institu-
tions and practices strong enough to assure depend-
able expectations of peaceful change. This means,
in turn, the solution of mutual problems without re-
sort to large-scale physical violence'.
• Professor; Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenha-
gen.
According to Deutsch, transactions such as
communication, trade and tourism should lead to
convergences in culture and a high degree of inter-
dependence, paving the way for a security commu-
nity. It may arise without the establishment of
supranational institutions; the Nordic countries since
1907, or the US and Canada since 1870, are men-
tioned as examples of such 'pluralistic' security com-
munities.
This peacefulness, both among the Nordic
countries and as a low-tension area in virtue of the
Nordic balance, marked a difference to the military
build-up in Central Europe during the Cold War and
to violent conflicts in other parts of the world. Al-
though it was basically due to favourable geopoliti-
cal fundamentals, probably, rather than popular trans-
actions as such or any inherent peacefulness, the
peaceful state of affairs was good PR for the region
and its countries. The Nordic countries' solid sup-
port for the UN as such and contributions to UN
peace-keeping forces in particular served to under-
pin this image. Unavoidably, there was occasionally
a certain self-righteous flavour to this role as 'world
conscience' .
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2. Cooperation and Competition
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
After the big European turbulence 1989-91,
with the East European revolutions and the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union, the Nordic security com-
munity is still intact, but the Nordic balance is gone.
As elsewhere, the power configurations of Northern
Europe have been transformed. Apart from the Rus-
sian great power, mostly preoccupied with its inter-
nal problems, what has developed in Northern Eu-
rope during the post-Cold War era seems to be two
pillars of 'parallel action'. The first one consists of
Denmark, Sweden and Finland; the second one of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In addition, we have
West-Norden in the form of Norway, Iceland, and
the Faroe Islands. I shall focus here mainly on the
former of the two parallel action pillars, even though,
of course, the remaining landscape is a vital prereq-
uisite for understanding its dynamics.
What is parallel action, then? Parallel action
is carried out by units with the same values, roughly
the same resource base and the same task environ-
ment" Denmark, Sweden and Finland share the val-
ues of protestant democracy and egalitarianism. Prot-
estant democracy refers to century-long diffusion
from the religious sector to broader societal layers,
translating the protestant 'priesthood of all believ-
ers' to preferences for non-hierarchical modes of
political organisation, including participatory democ-
racy, grass-root influence, etc. Egalitarianism refers
to the economic counterpart to this phenomenon,
emphasising the reduction of cleavages between rich
and poor, both domestically and on a global scale.
Also, the countries have a roughly similar resource
base (' small states', to use an unfruitful but accepted
term). They all share the EU agenda and have Baltic
Sea shores. With the prevailing great power restraint,
this latter feature gives them the re-emerged states
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as essential task
environments and cooperation partners - although not
partners on an equal footing with themselves.
This leads to a pattern of parallel action among
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, meaning both co-
operation and competition. Cooperation/mutual in-
spiration and competition/jealousy/rivalry in this
sense are actually two sides of the same coin. The
more you cooperate, the more you have in common,
and therefore the more you can quarrel about. You
can quarrel about coordination or its absence, who
should take the honour for this or that initiative, and
so on. For every assistance effort there is a credit
side, but the more credit to one party, the less to an-
other, evidently. But what is the ultimate issue in all
this, then? One issue is, of course, who (if any) should
be the informal leader of the so-called 'Baltic sea
region' .
That is not just a question of which capital
should be visited by president Clinton or who should
host the secretariat of the Council of Baltic Sea
States. It is a question of the popularly underesti-
mated, but nonetheless important, commodity of
political prestige - that we are familiar with from a
great power context. Political prestige is a convert-
ible currency that is important, since it can be used
as an asset in future situations; 'we can speak with
added weight in various fora'. My point here is just
that this competition is something natural; there is
nothing embarrassing about it, as it is sometimes
depicted in Nordic media. Parallel action is what
could be theoretically expected in view of the three
preconditions mentioned above, also in a security
community.
There are nuances, of course. The advantages
of Sweden and Finland in this competition are their
'true' Balticness in geographical terms and the real
historical and mental ties to countries on the oppo-
site shores, being largely absent in the Danish case.
Denmark's advantage, on the other hand, is its status
as the only Nordic country being both a NATO and
an EU member. Finland borders Russia and this
makes for greater caution in high politics, but it also
has its special relationship with Estonia, geographi-
cally and linguistically conditioned. The Finnish rela-
tive indifference to Latvia and Lithuania during the
EU enlargement process, compared to the postures
of Denmark and Sweden, sustains the view that the
Danish and Swedish overall leadership ambitions are
stronger than that of Finland. Still, Finland is un-
willing to accept someone else's leadership. In rough
outline, it seems that the three countries in question
constitute a leadership troika regarding regional co-
operation and influence on Estonia, whereas Den-
mark and Sweden form a corresponding duo in rela-
tion to Latvia and a troika together with Poland in
relation to Lithuania.
What about Norway, then? Norway shares
values with those in the parallel action pillar, has
approximately the same resource base, but a differ-
ent task environment. Bordering Russia to the 'North
of the North', the Barents cooperation is more im-
portant for Norway than the distant Baltic countries;
specific interests like oil, fish and nuclear waste are
at stake (of course, Norway displays a certain inter-
est in the Baltic Sea cooperation in return for others
doing the same regarding Barents, but that is mar-
ginal after all). In the Cold War setting, Denmark
APRIL - SEPTEMBER 1999 97
and Norway performed parallel action within NATO,
because they were both frontline states and could
therefore support each other in giving credibility to
the same low profile. Denmark, having got rid of
such concerns from 1988-89, and Norway, being
moreover outside the EU, whose agenda is common
to the parallel action states, Norway is indeed the
odd man out in political terms, together with Iceland
(not performing any less successfully for that rea-
son, one should add).
One can argue, of course, whether to label the
parallel action pillar 'Nordic'. Firstly, however, that
would be an insult to Norway and Iceland. Secondly,
'Nordic' gives it a flavour of romanticism that is quite
out of tune with realities. As the parallel action pil-
lar functions, it is very much the national interests
of Denmark, the national interests of Sweden, and
the national interests of Finland that are being pur-
sued in mutual cooperation and competition. There
is much more high politics in the relations between
these countries today than ever since at least 19493.
With the three countries all being EU mem-
bers and sharing the Nordic values and task environ-
ment described above, the 'North-EU' pillar is prob-
ably the most precise label.
3. Enlarging
a Security Community?
It has been suggested to incorporate the Balts
in the established Nordic cooperation machinery, the
Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers.
Still, adding 5+3 to become 8 does not change the
real political picture in the North, which is one of
3+3, the two pillars of parallel action. An institu-
tional amendment of this type cannot change geopo-
litical fundamentals, and hardly even modify their
implications. However, in addition to improving the
virtues of the 3+3 structure in itself, the North- EU
pillar can support the Baltic one on its way into the
EU. In particular Denmark and Sweden are willing
to make that effort on a comprehensive basis. Cur-
rently, the EU with its 'soft security' is what seems
realistic (and sufficient) for the Balts, given the re-
served attitudes among larger NATO-countries re-
garding enlargement and given progress in Russian
disarmament. The long-term ambition that Denmark,
Sweden and Finland seem to nurture is to transform
the Baltic Sea region in its entirety into a security
community. This must, by necessity, involve Russia
in the process. If and when the Baltic countries have
gained EU membership, a necessary - though hardly
sufficient - prerequisite for such a community to be
established is a stable and interdependent EU-Rus-
sia relationship.
Evidently, the Nordic countries, including
Denmark, Sweden and Finland, do still constitute a
security community among themselves. But even a
security community may have its political rivalries.
However, being a security community is no longer a
Nordic privilege in the Europe of stable EC/EU in-
tegration. Also, the three countries have now included
an area in their task environment that is in no way a
security community, i.e. the Baltic eastern shore.
Even though Denmark, Sweden and Finland have
renounced sole responsibility for the Balts' security,
referring it to the EU or NATO as a whole, they have
put their prestige at risk on the consolidation and
prosperity of the Baltic states and, in a long-term
perspective, probably an enlargement of their own
security community to the eastern shore of the Bal-
tic Sea. Apart from the inherent risk, it entails op-
portunity as well.
Should they be successful in their endeavour,
this might actually be as much of a PR triumph as
the 'world conscience' role during the Cold War, and
enhance the countries' own regional prestige. It
amounts, if successful, to the 'exporting' of secu-
rity beyond their own area, not only displaying
ofthe area's own peacefulness to the world around
as during the Cold War.
Admittedly, the countries also tried to export
security during the Cold War through UN peace-
keeping forces. However, much less prestige was
involved in those faraway operations that were (and
are) in fact a kind of foreign aid by other means. In
the Baltic neighbourhood, by contrast, geopolitical,
geoeconomic and ideological self-interest is much
more obvious and specific. High politics is at stake
for each of the three countries.
NOTES
•
My analysis is not necessarily representing the view of DUPI,
the Danish Institute of International Affairs, and even less
any official Danish view. It is based solely on my own analy-
sis as an independent researcher.
1 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area, Princeton University Press, 1957.
2 The term was coined by the Danish-Californian researcher
Gunnar Nielsson, although it is defined and applied differently
here.
3 Clive Archer and the present author have dealt with this in a
more nuanced way in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997
than space allows here.
